In the post cold war era, our military is extremely dependent on joint strategic deployment assets to get our forces to the fight. Deployment operations need to be fully linked using the principles of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I). Today, more than ever, we need comprehensive, well thought-out plans that maximize the use of available assets, insuring that cargo flows through a water port as efficiently as possible.
Single port management doctrine will provide the continuity and the seamless transfer of cargo necessary to meet deployment missions. The doctrine on single port management is still evolving and not entirely written. With clearly defined responsibilities and accepted doctrine, our ability to support geographic commanders greatly improves. Only then we will have a seamless fort-to-foxhole joint logistics management process. 
REFERENCE MATERIALS 31
"Orders to the chief commissary of the expedition were to load six months rations for 20,000 men.
In the interest of haste, this amount is reduced to two months rations.
Then the quartermaster designed several vessels on each of which 100,000 rations were to be placed so that all would be assured of a reserve in case of separation.
This amounted to some 5,000 tons of food; much had to be handled several times.
The stevedores became so exhausted that they would fall asleep wherever they happened to be whenever they were relieved. Similarly the, artillery pieces, carriages, and ammunition arrived at different times from different arsenals. The decision of the commanders that the guns should be mounted before loading, further delayed the operation." processes as gaining more intransit visibility (ITV) over items moving through the transportation system to maximizing dwindling resources to achieve the optimal flow of materiel into a theater of operation. Today, just as it was 100 years ago, our goal as port operators is ensuring efficient and effective seamless movement of personnel and materiel into a theater when and where a theater commander-in-chief (CINC) wants it.
Although much has been written about "just in time logistics" and we have made great leaps in automating our logistic process, we still encounter many commanders who undervalue the importance of logistics and its impact on success or failure of an operation. James A. Huston, author of The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, perhaps put it best when he said, "logistics is nine-tenths of the business of war." 2 Today, more than ever, we need comprehensive, well thought-out plans that maximize the use of available assets, insuring that cargo flows through a port as efficiently as possible. Most planners agree that the time between initial arrival of cargo and personnel at a water port facility, and its operational employment, is probably the period of greatest vulnerability for the deploying unit.
In the post cold war era, our military is extremely dependent on joint strategic deployment assets to get our forces to the fight. Deployment operations now and in the future will be Joint, which makes command and control at water port facilities a complicated and sometimes cumbersome process. This paper addresses concepts and issues surrounding command relationships during water port operations, specifically, "who runs the water port" for the geographic CINC during deployments. 
RSO&I PROCESS
The RSO&I process is not logistics, but a phase of operations with heavy logistics implications. Units that approach RSO&I with the same intensity and methodology as combat operations tend to perform better than units that relegate RSO&I functions to the logistics staff. To be successful at RSO&I requires the same level of command emphasis, planning, rehearsal, synchronization drills and attention to detail as other operations. 5 
RSO&I: RECEPTION
Reception is the off-loading of personnel and material from strategic lift assets at a point of debarkation for relocation to designated areas. 
LESSONS LEARNED
Lessons learned provide a valuable tool in the critical analysis of how we can operate more effectively and efficiently. About a year after our experiences with Desert Storm/Shield, troops were deployed to Somalia on operation RESTORE HOPE and to Rwanda for the humanitarian relief operation, SUPPORT HOPE. In Somalia, the JFC initially assigned seaport operations to the Navy complicating the operation because the Army was the predominant deploying force. Later the Army assumed the water port operation and management mission. Shifting responsibility caused confusion and again drew questions as to "who was in charge" of seaport operations and on at least one occasion enabled the service with seaport control to give priority to its own requirements while other cargo was delayed. Group has an established chain of command, large work force, and is easily deployable. The most significant aspect is that the 7 th Groups trains and works together on a daily basis.
It is clear that there are major differences between the two organizational structures and the manner in which they deploy.
It is not difficult to understand why the 7 th Transportation
Group would perhaps be the "unit of choice" by a geographic CINC when contingencies arise. Without clear doctrinal and uniform guidance, geographic CINCs will continue to use whichever unit they perceive as providing the best support for their particular mission. This allows interpretation and analysis of who should manage and operate the water port facility that could be faulty particularly since the CINCs' staff may not know the roles and responsibilities of the 7 th Group and MTMC. If we can overcome doctrinal challenges and clearly articulate in advance which organization a geographical CINC will call upon, we can greatly improve strategic deployments.
BRIDGING THE GAP
As indicated on the proceeding pages there is a need for The inter-action between MTMC and the warfighting CINC becomes extremely important for integration of the RSO&I process into the contingency plan. It places command emphasis on the importance of receiving and processing equipment and personnel at a seaport.
It also allows MTMC to advise the supported CINC on the size of the logistics footprint required to effectively operate a seaport.
• Establish liaison with host nation port authorities and develop contracts for stevedoring and related terminal services.
As DoD's seaport manager, MTMC has permanent presence in 25 seaports worldwide. Since the 7 th Transportation Group is an early deployer, it will, in all likelihood, be one of the first organizations at the seaport facility. Its primary role is to transform personnel and materiel into combat effect forces i.e., conduct RSO&I processes.
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The port operator ensures the expeditious and well-documented transfer of deploying unit equipment into the theater of operations. • Contingency plans must reflect which organization will be the seaport manager for the geographic CINC. Early identification greatly enhances the deliberate planning process, insuring unity of command.
• Once the seaport managers are in place, they must remain constant so that any changes in operations are transparent to the supported CINC. Unit integrity at the seaport provides stability and continuity of effort.
• The supported CINC's movement requirements take precedence during contingency operations. Early identification of requirements enable the seaport operators to plan current operations, develop and pass workload instructions, and forecast future workload operations.
• Knowing where unit cargo is in the transportation system (intransit visibility, ITV) is paramount in projecting force closure for the geographic CINC. Without force closure, the CINC can not perform his mission. ITV enables the seaport manager to determine his logistics footprint and to adjust his workforce to accommodate projected workload.
• Geographie CINCs must program as part of their deployment plans early arrival of seaport managers and operators. This is often difficult to do since the CINC is focused on building combat power as quickly as possible and may not want to give up aircraft space to support personnel. 24 • Joint training on seaport management and operations must be developed and practiced.
Perhaps the most significant item on developing the doctrine above, is the last one on joint training. In December 1997, The JDTC will devote a portion of its curriculum to the management and operation of seaports during contingencies.
They will use the principles of RSO&I, integrating the process at all levels of the deployment spectrum from unit to theater. More importantly, the JDTC will further concepts such as single port management ensuring that all joint deployment doctrine is tied together for a common purpose. The JDTC envisions that it will evolve into both a resident course and a distance learning course that will allow anyone involved in the deployment process to quickly access deployment doctrine. The JDTC is best chance for the for the single port management concept to be integrated into the joint doctrine.
CONCLUSION
"For the discharge of supplies and equipment the Armywas left to its own resources.
To get the animals ashore the simple expedient was to open the side hatches, push them into the water, and let them swim for it. Fifty of the 450 mules were lost when they turned the wrong way and swam out to sea." 
